000K utf8 1100 $c2019 1500 eng 2050 urn:nbn:de:hbz:708-dh9793 2051 10.18445/20190513-161341-0 3000 Meister, Helmut 4000 On a Useful Characterization of Nash Equilibria in Decision Trees$hFernUniversität in Hagen [Meister, Helmut] 4030 Hagen$nFernUniversität in Hagen 4060 17 Seiten 4209 The concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is broadly accepted in the theory of non-cooperative games in extensive form and offers a method of equilibrium calculation called backward induction. Nevertheless, there often exist many other equilibria, which might also be interesting, because they require some coordination by groups of players. The most frequently cited literature does not provide an effective mechanism to identify all equilibria of games in extensive form. The present paper gives an answer to this problem. First, a general characterization of equilibrium is derived. This result offers a way to specify an algorithm, which lists all paths to terminal points of the game arising from equilibrium strategies. Finally, an application of the results to the decision problem of the Cuban Missile Crisis will be discussed. 4950 https://doi.org/10.18445/20190513-161341-0$xR$3Volltext$534 4950 https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:708-dh9793$xR$3Volltext$534 4961 https://ub-deposit.fernuni-hagen.de/receive/mir_mods_00001510 5051 510 5550 Backward Induction 5550 Decision Tree 5550 Entangled Subgame 5550 Equilibrium Identification Algorithm 5550 Equilibrium Path 5550 Extensive Form Game 5550 Game Theory 5550 Nash Equilibrium Strategies 5550 Subgame Perfectness