A note on Nash equilibrium in soccer

Schlepütz, Volker GND; Sonnabend, Hendrik GND

In this note, we extend the soccer game studied by Moschini (2004) by analysing the sequential game as suggested by him. The analysis supports multiple subgame perfect equilibria. More important, under non-commitment, in equilibrium, no goals are scored at all. This raises the problem that sequential play performes poor in explaining empirical fndings on players' strategies in soccer. Reconsidered under an enlarged set of game forms, our results suggest to view soccer most plausibly as a simultaneous move game.

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Schlepütz, Volker / Sonnabend, Hendrik: A note on Nash equilibrium in soccer. Hagen 2007. FernUniversität in Hagen.

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